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KNOWING THAT ONE KNOWS 
Robert Segal 
Many contemporary philosophers advocate the thesis 
that knowing implies knowing that one knows (KK thesis). 
In particular,, this thesis is explicitly argued for by 
Risto Hilpinen. In this essay, I shall (1) briefly spell 
out the gist of the KK thesis as presented by Hilpinen, 
(2) review two intuitive responses to the KK thesis made 
by David Rynin, and note how Hilpinen handles these 
responses, (3) lend some support for the intuitiveness 
(prima facie plausibility) of Rynin's remarks, and (4) 
present an argument against the KK thesis here considered, 
and in so doing offer a counter-example to the KK thesis. 
I 
Hilpinen considers a KK thesis which presupposes (is 
founded upon) a "classical" definition of knowledge, i.e., 
a justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge. S 
knows that p if and only if 
(i) p is true, 
(ii) S believes that p, and 
(iii) S is completely justified in believing p. 
Various alternative locutions may be substituted in 
formulating this account of knowledge. For example, (ii) 
may be replaced by (ii,) S accepts p, or (ii~) S is sure 
of p. (iii) may be replaced by (iii,) S has adequate 
evidence for p, or (iii_) S has the right to be sure that 
p, or (iii 3) S can give adequate evidence for p. 
Undoubtedly, these various alternative locutions differ in 
some rather salient respects. But Hilpinen is not too 
concerned about distinguishing these respects, nor shall I 
be. Instead, let us state the classical definition of 
knowledge with which Hilpinen works: 11 If 'a believes that 
p' (or 'a accepts p 1 ) is expressed by 'Bap' and the 
justification requirement of the classical definition by 
'Eap, 1 the definition of knowledge (Hilpinen, p. Ill) may 
be expressed in short as: a knows that p (Kap) if and 
only if 
(i) Bap, 
(ii) Eap, and 
(iii) p is true. 
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Now, the KK thesis maintains the following: Kap 
KaKap, i.e., if someone 'a' knows that p, then 'a' knows 
that he ('a') knows that p. To break this down into 
simplified form, KaKap = Ka (Bap & Eap & p ) . Along with 
Hilpinen, I shall allow the operator 'K' to distribute 
over conjunctions. So, 
(1) KaKap = (KaBap & KaEap & Kap). Further 
simplifications yield the following: 
(2) KaKap = (BaBap & EaBap & Bap & BaEap & EaEap & Eap & 
Bap SL Eap & p ) . In short and simplified form the KK 
thesis holds the following: 
(3) (Bap & Eap & p ) — ) (BaBap & EaBap & BaEap & EaEap). 
Along with Hilpinen, I shall agree that (3) is not 
valid unless the consequent is implied by (Bap & 
Eap). So, the validity of (3) depends on the 
validity of 
(4) (Bap & Eap)—> (BaBap & EaBap & BaEap & EaEap). 
Now Hilpinen correctly notes that the KK thesis 
requires 
(A) Bap—> BaBap, and 
(B) Bap & Eap—yBaEap. 
Hilpinen accepts (A) tentatively (Hilpinen, p. 113). But 
he argues that (B) is definitely unacceptable (Hilpinen, 
p. 114). Someone might believe that p and have adequate 
evidence that p, but nonetheless "fail to recognize his 
evidence for what it is worth" (Hilpinen, p. 113). Given 
the classical JTB account of knowledge, Hilpinen concludes 
that one may know that p, but fail to know that one knows 
that p (in failing to recognize the adequacy of one's 
evidence). Because the antecedent of (B) may be true, 
while the consequent false, the KK thesis fails. It is 
clear, furthermore, that Hilpinen thinks that all the 
other requirements necessary to defend the KK thesis 
obtain. That is, apart from (B) not obtaining, all the 
other necessary conditions for the KK thesis obtain. 
In order to remedy this defect in the KK thesis 
considered above, Hilpinen adds to the definitions of 
knowledge a fourth condition: (iv) BaEap (Hilpinen, p. 
117). So, with this fourth condition added to the 
definition of knowledge, a new KK theiss (KK,) allegedly 
obtains. For the only defect with the KK thesis was 
(allegedly) the falsity of (B). Since the consequent of 
(B) has been added as a necessary condition of knowledge, 
the defect of the KK thesis is removed by definition. 
Hence, it is alleged that if Kap, then KaKap. It is 
also alleged that the truth conditions for Kap are 
identical with the truth conditions for KaKap. It is also 
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alleged that one cannot know that p without knowing that 
one knows that p. 
In what follows, I will argue that the KK thesis is 
false because (A) is false- I will argue that (KK.) is 
false as well due to the falsity of (A). But before I 
present my argument, let us consider some intuitive 
responses to the KK 1 thesis. 
II 
As Hilpinen notes, David Rynin offers two intuitive 
objections to the KK, thesis. First, Rynin writes: "if 
one assumes that If one knows that p then one must know 
that one knows that p, and if it be granted that one could 
be mistaken unless one knows that one knows, it would seem 
to me that there could be no knowledge, for in my view one 
could always be mistaken, i.e., one could never be sure in 
the intended sense." J Second, ."if it is demonstrable 
that if one knows that p, then it follows that one knows 
that he knows that p it would seem to me very difficult if 
not impossible ever to know, for it seems clear to me that 
this infinite process soon takes us beyond comprehension" 
(Rynin, p. 29). 
Hilpinen is able to deal with these two objections 
handily. Concerning the first objection, Hilpinen notes 
that according to the KK, thesis, the truth conditions for 
Kap and KaKap are identical. Thus, if one is unsure of 
KaKap, then one is likewise unsure of Kap. In regard to 
the second objection, Hilpinen notes that since Kap and 
KaKap share identical truth conditions (and allegedly 
imply each other), "the latter statement (KaKap) yields no 
information in excess of that provided by the former (Kap) 
. . . . Kap, and say, KaKaKaKap are just two ways of 
expressing the same thing in writing . . . . The 
difficulty here is on the side of those philosophers 
rejecting the KK. thesis, for they have the task of 
inventing for the latter expression (KaKaKaKap) a meaning 
which differs from that of the former (Kap)" (Hilpinen, p. 
126). For Hilpinen, there is obviously no vicious regress 
to which Rynin's objections allude. 
Reflecting on how Hilpinen deals with Rynin's 
objections, I think the meaning of the KK. thesis has been 
made a bit more perspicuous. For it is now clear that the 
KK^ thesis maintains the following: 
(a) 'Kap' and "KaKaKaKap' have identical truth 
conditions. 
(b) 'Kap' and 'KaKaKaKap' mean the very same thing, i.e., 
the latter expression is just another way of saying 
the former (though the former is more preferable for 
practical reasons). 
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I think that (b) is linguistically counter-intuitive. 
And this, I believe, prompted Rynin's objections to the 
KK, thesis. I now want to lend some support for the prima 
facie plausibility of Rynin's remarks (this boils down to 
showing why someone might reject (b), or more likely, 
unreflectively assume that the negation of (b) is the 
case). 
Why might someone intuitively assume that the 
negation of (b) is the case? Why would this be the 
natural thing to hold? 
First, it is generally true that there is no 
inconsistency between someone 'a' not knowing that p, and 
p nonetheless being the case. For example, my brother. 
David, who resides in Connecticut, does not know that the 
capital of Illinois is Springfield. But it is true that 
the capital of Illinois is Springfield. There is no 
inconsistency in the state of affairs where (1) David does 
not know that the capital of Illinois is Springfield, and 
(2) the capital of Illinois is Springfield. 
Nor is there an inconsistency in David not knowing 
something about himself. Consider the following case. 
David is the great great grandchild of his great great 
grandfather Isaac, and David does not know that this is 
so. Surely there is not inconsistency here. Many people 
don't know who their ancestors were, although these 
ancestors are nonetheless these particular ancestors (with 
such and such offspring who had such and such offspring). 
Clearly then, many facts are facts regardless of somebody 
knowing that they (the facts) are so. 
But isn't "John knows that p" a fact? Why then 
should this fact ("John knows that p") be different from 
other facts? Why must John know that he knows that p? Is 
"knowing" peculiar in the sense that whenever someone 
knows that p, he must also know that he knows that p? 
This is what the KK. thesis comes to. The KK., thesis 
points to an oddity in the logic of knowing. 
Perhaps the oddity is not restricted to the concept 
of knowledge. Perhaps, for example, other mental concepts 
share this alleged feature of knowledge. Consider the 
verb "to want." Might someone want p without knowing that 
(s)he wants p? Surely this is possible. David may want 
something without recognizing that he does. His want may 
be unconscious, as it were. But this alone may not 
suffice to show that David doesn't know that he wants p. 
However, David may want p, without even believing that he 
wants p. Perhaps David comes from a strict Jewish family. 
He may want to marry a non-Jewish woman (due to unusual 
psychological factors), but not believe that he wants to 
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marry a non-Jewish woman. In such a case, David wants p 
but does not believe that he wants p. Indeed, David may 
very well believe that he wants to marry a Jewish woman. 
If belief is a necessary condition of knowing, then David 
does not know that he wants to marry a non-Jewish woman, 
though he still may want to marry a non-Jewish woman. As 
will be shown later, someone may believe that p, but not 
believe that he believes that p. So, someone may believe 
that p without knowing that (s)he believes that p (again 
providing that belief is a necessary condition of 
knowing). 
If the KK, thesis is correct, then a restricted class 
of facts (e.g. *Kap*) are peculiar and distinct from most 
other facts in that knowledge that p requires that one 
know that one knows. 
To push this point one step further, this peculiar 
feature of the logic of knowing does not even apply to 
"not knowing that p." Consider, the following statements: 
(x) S does not know that the barn is yellow, 
(y) s does not know that he does not know that the barn is 
yellow. 
(z) S knows that he does not know that the barn is 
yellow. 
One might suspect, on first blush, that the truth of 
the KK, thesis would render (x) and (y) as sharing 
identical truth conditions. But this is not the case. It 
is obvious that (y) and (z) yield a contradiction. But 
(x) and (z) are clearly compatible. (x) and (y) are also 
compatible. Thus, (x) and '(y.) cannot have identical truth 
conditions. Furthermore, (x) may be the case without (y) 
being the case. To see this clearly, consider the 
following case. Sam doesn't know that the barn is yellow. 
This is so just because the barn is, as it happens, red. 
Now, suppose Sam knows that the barn is red. Here is a 
case where (x) (Sam doesn't know that the barn is yellow), 
and (z) (Sam knows that he doesn't know that the barn is 
yellow), may obviously be compatible. For if Sam knows 
that the barn is red, he may already know, or come to 
know, that he doesn't know that the barn is yellow. 
So, if the KK, thesis is correct, not only does 'Kap' 
require "KaKap,' while other facts may be so without being 
known, '-Kap' is assymmetrical with 'Kap' regarding this 
odd logical feature of 'Kap.' 
These reflections are not meant to discredit the KK, 
thesis. But I hope that I have highlighted 5 
distinguishing consequence of the KK, thesis, i.e., the 
distinctive logical peculiarity of 'Kap.' Because most 
facts may be so without being known, I think it was 
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natural and intuitive for Rynin to suppose that the fact 
'•Kap1 may be so while 'KaKap' is so as well. Working 
under this assumption, it is easy to see how Rynin 
envisioned a vicious regress being initiated by the KK, 
thesis. 
Second, the KK, thesis denies levels of knowledge. 
This is, for reasons analogous to my first point, 
linguistically counter-intuitive. It is far from obvious 
that 'Kap* means the same thing as 'KaKap.' 
But perhaps the defenders of the KK, thesis have, as 
they have claimed, uncovered a peculiar and interesting 
feature of the logic of knowing, namely, that Kap—> KaKap. 
Let us now turn to the KK and KK, theses. 
IV 
Given the JTB conception of knowledge, Hilpinen 
argues that the KK thesis is false (due to the falsity of 
(B)). But after Hilpinen amends the JTB conception of 
knowledge, he arrives at a new version of the KK thesis 
(what I've been calling the KK^ thesis). 
On the KK, thesis, the JTB conception of knowledge 
has a fourth condition added to it: (iv) BaEap. From 
this new definition of knowledge, the KK, thesis allegedly 
obtains. 
My present purpose is twofold. First, I want to 
argue that the KK thesis (from the tri-part, unaltered JTB 
definition of knowledge) is false because (A) is false. 
I will then argue that the falsity of (A) renders the 
revised KK thesis, i.e., the KK^ thesis, false as well. 
I think that there are numerous cases, and ordinary 
cases at that, where someone believes that p, but does not 
believe that (s)he believes that p. There are at least 
two ways for someone to believe p without believing that 
(s)he believes that p: 
(5) Someone 'a' disbelieves that (s)he believes that p, 
or 
(6) Someone., 'a' withholds believing that (s)he believes 
that p. Because an instance of (5) would be a 
powerful denial of (A), I shall employ an instance of 
(5) as my denial of (A). 
Of course, apart, from displaying a genuine instance of 
(5), I shall have to show that such a belief is consistent 
with the definitions of knowledge assumed by the KK and 
KK, thesis, in order to falsify the KK and KK, theses. 
But first, let me present an instance of (5). 
] RA 
Tom is a politically liberal person. Most of his 
friends are politically liberal as well. Tom prides 
himself, in fact, on being politically aware and on 
carefully evaluating political candidates. He votes for 
the candidate he considers to be the best candidate 
(regardless of political affiliation). Finally, Tom does 
not like to upset his wife, and he very much tries to 
avoid arguments with her. 
Now, Tom's wife, Joan, is a dogmatic Republican. She 
always votes Republican, regardless of who the candidates 
are. Furthermore, she is often politically unaware. She 
even refuses to discuss candidates or issues. In fact, 
whenever someone suggests to her that a Democratic 
candidate is worhty of her vote, she reacts in an 
emotional and almost fanatical manner, violently 
disagreeing. She is completely close-minded on these 
matters. 
In our case, Tom believes that Joan is dogmatic and 
close-minded politically"! His behavior clearly indicates 
that he has this belief. For Tom never brings up 
political issues with his wife any more (he did so a few 
times long ago, and she reacted as described above). He 
never tries to persuade her to vote for a non-Republican 
(although he does, on occasion, try to persuade other 
acquaintances to vote for certain individuals, sometimes 
Democrats). In fact, Tom doesn't even advocate political 
awareness as a virtue in the presence of his wife. Nor 
does Tom question or criticize his wife's political 
dogmatism. This is because, as it happens, Tom believes 
that his wife is politically dogmatic (PD). Since Tom 
wants very much to avoid upsetting and arguing with his 
wife, he behaves as he does. 
The twist in this case is that although Tom's 
behavior clearly indicates that he believes that his wife 
is PD, Tom does not believe that he believes this. In 
fact, Tom disbelieves that he believes that his wife is 
PD. We may suppose, in this case, that Tom has deceived 
himself so that he does not believe that he believes that 
p, although he does believe that p. 
Before I try to show that Tom's belief (that his wife 
is PD) is consistent with the definitions of knowledge 
given in the KK and KK. theses, two important points of 
clarification need to be made concerning our example. 
First, someone might reject our example as a denial 
of (A). It might be argued that Tom does not disbelieve 
that he believes that p, but rather, Tom merely holds two 
contradictory beliefs. That is, Tom simply believes, on 
the one hand, that Joan is PD, and on the other hand 
believes she is not PD. It might be held that holding 
these contradictory beliefs fully explains the case at 
hand, without reference to Tom disbelieving that he 
believes that his wife is PD. And so, our example may be 
discredited. 
I do not think, however, that this critique succeeds. 
Let us grant that Tom may have two contradictory beliefs 
concerning his wife's dogmatism. The further question 
still remains: Does Tom believe that he believes that 
Jöan is PD? The answer to this question is "NO." To see 
this clearly, consider the following conversation between 
Tom and Bill. Bill mentions to Tom that Joan's political 
dogmatism disturbs his (Bill's) wife, which is why Bill 
hasn't invited Tom and Joan over for dinner lately. Bill 
is thinking all along that Tom is aware of his wife's 
political dogmatism. Indeed, Bill assumed this as a 
result of carefully observing Tom's behavior. Tom 
responds: "What do you mean? My wife is as open-minded 
as you or me!" We may well imagine that, after some 
tactful discussion. Bill convinces Tom that (1) Joan is 
PD, and (2) Tom believed all along that she was PD. In 
coming to believe (2), it is obvious, I think, that Tom 
would be learning something from Bill; he might come to 
believe something which he had hitherto not believed. Tom 
might comment, at this point, "I guess I believed she was 
PD all along, but I refused to believe that I believed 
it." Perhaps Tom will even conclude that he had been 
deceiving himself all along, in order to sustain an image 
of his wife he found psychologically acceptable. 
The point is simply that the case described is one, I 
think, where Tom believes that p, but disbelieves that he 
believes that p. Such cases are, I think, not uncommon. 
A second objection to our example might deny that 
Tom's behavior is ever a conclusive indicator of Tom's 
belief. That is, supposing that exhibited behaviour is 
logically distinct from belief, one might conclude that 
behavior is never a conclusive indicator of belief. Thus, 
one might contend that although Tom behaves as though he 
believes that his wife is PD, he nonetheless does not 
believe that she is PD. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full 
scale analysis of the nature of belief. But whatever such 
an analysis entails, I think that a person's exhibited 
behavior will at least sometimes serve as a reliable 
indicator of what that person believes. This could 
certainly be so even if exhibited behavior is logically 
distinct from belief. I think my assumption here is very 
plausible. And I think our example is one where Tom's 
behavior is a reliable indicator of what Tom believes. 
Commonsense supports my point quite nicely. The point is 
aptly put in the hackneyed though pithy cliche "actions 
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speak louder than words." This phrase is particularly 
relevant to our example. Tom's actions indicate that he 
believes Joan is PD, though Tom does not believe that he 
believes this. 
Finally, let me make two points clear concerning our • 
second objection. First, I have neither been presupposing 
nor assuming any version of philosophical behaviorism. On 
the contrary, my position in this essay is neutral on this 
issue. I have minimally supposed that behavior is 
sometimes an indicator of a person's belief. Perhaps the 
belief is a disposition to behave. Perhaps the belief, in 
conjunction with a desire, causes the action. Perhaps the 
belief is simply correlated with certain behavior, without 
any causal interaction at all involved. I have not 
committed myself to any one of these, or any other view 
concerning the relation between behavior and belief. I 
have, however, assumed that persons do have beliefs, they 
do exhibit behavior, and sometimes behavior is a reliable 
indicator of certain beliefs. Second, I have argued that 
many beliefs are unconsciously held. We are often unaware 
of many beliefs we hold. But these beliefs are still 
full-blooded beliefs. I think that this position is 
extremely plausible. It is very unlikely that one is 
conscious of all the beliefs (s)he holds. At any rate, I 
admit that this assumption is working in our instance of 
(5). 
To sum up, I have tried to explicate a case where 
someone (Tom) believes that p, but does not believe that 
he believes that p. The case presented is not 
unrealistic. On the contrary, I believed that many 
instances of our case, and many slight variations on the 
main theme of our case, occur in the day to day lives of 
many people. 
Now, is Tom's belief (that Joan is PD) consistent 
with the definition of knowledge? That is, given the 
definition of knowledge, and given Tom's belief (in our 
case), might Tom know that his wife is PD? I shall 
proceed to consider whether Tom might actually know that 
P, first given the JTB conception of knowledge (as given 
in the KK thesis), then on the amended JTB conception of 
knowledge (as given in the KK^ thesis). 
Before we proceed, we may note that if Tom may know 
that Joan is PD, given the JTB conception of knowledge and 
given Tom's belief in our case, then the KK thesis is 
false. This would obtain just because Tom would know that 
p, but not believe that he knows that p. Likewise, if Tom 
may know that Joan is PD given the amended JTB conception 
of knowledge, and given Tom's belief in our case, then the 
KK. thesis would be false for the same reason as the KK 
thesis. 
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The KK thesis defines knowledge as follows. Kap if 
and only if 
(i) p is true, 
(ii) a believes that p, and 
(iii) a is completely justified in p. 
In our case, (ii) is satisfied. Tom believes that 
Joan is PD. (i) is also satisfied. Joan is, as it 
happens, truly PD. Even though Tom does not believe that 
he believes that Joan is PD, the fact remains that she is 
PD. There is, so far, nothing contradictory about this 
state of affairs. 
Given Tom's belief (he does not believe that he 
believes), can Tom nonetheless be completely justified in 
believing that his wife is PD? One might suppose, I 
suspect, that Tom's disbelieved belief renders it 
impossible for Tom to fulfill condition (iii), i.e., 
renders it impossible for Tom to be completely justified 
in believing that his wife is PD. Unless Tom at least 
believes that he believes that p, Tom cannot be completely 
justified in believing that p. 
Even though Tom disbelieves his belief that Joan is 
PD, I think Tom may nonetheless be completely justified in 
believing that his wife is PD. Recalling the details of 
our example, Tom does not irrationally believe that his 
wife is PD. Rather, we noted that (1) Joan always votes 
Republican, regardless of who is running for election, (2.) 
Joan refuses to discuss candidates or issues, (3) Joan is 
often politically unaware, (4) she reacts in an emotional 
and almost fanatical way when it is suggested to her to 
vote Democratic, and (5) she is completely close-minded on 
political matters—she always sides with Republicans. (1) 
through (5) seem to be a rather plausible candidate for a 
complete justification that Joan is PD. And if one thinks 
more information is required for a complete justification, 
it is clear that we only need to tack it onto our case. 
There is no problem with our position for that. 
Now, Tom is aware of these reasons (1) through (5), 
albeit in an unconscious way. These reasons serve as his 
reasons for his behavior. These reasons explain his 
actions. It is because of (1) through (5) that Tom 
behaves and believes the way he does. Tom does not want 
to get into an argument with his wife. He does not want 
to upset her. 
Perhaps one might object as follows: one might 
identify reasons with conscious reasons, where a man's 
conscious reasons are those he can tell us about. To 
equate reasons for which he believes something with 
reasons he can tell us about is to assume that reasons for 
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which he believes something are. conscious reasons; and 
that assumption is a mistake. The reasons for which 
people believe things are rarely conscious. People often 
believe things for good reasons which give them knowledge, 
without being able to say what those reasons are." 
In our case, (1) through (5) are Tom's reasons for 
believing that his wife is PD, although these reasons are 
not conscious reasons. Tom's not believing that he 
believes that Joan is PD is irrelevant to Tom's being 
completely justified in believing that Joan is PD. So 
long as (1) through (5) completely justify Tom's belief, 
and function as Tom's reasons for believing that Joan is 
PD, then Tom is completely justified in believing that 
Joan is PD. In our case, these reasons are unconscious 
reasons. Furthermore, Tom disbelieves that he believes 
that Joan is PD, even though his belief that Joan is PD is 
completely justified. 
If the satisfaction of (i), (ii), and (iii). ever 
constitute a case of knowledge, I do not see why our case 
should not. At any rate, Tom's belief (where he 
disbelieves that he believes) does not rule out his 
knowing that his wife is PD (given the definition of 
knowledge here assumed). 
Recalling our case, suppose Bill comes along, and 
points out to Tom that (1) Tom believes Joan is PD, (2) 
Joan is PD, and (3) Tom is completely justified in 
believing that Joan is PD. This might well be a 
revelation to Tom. For Tom knew all along that she was 
PD, he just didn't know that he knew it. Tom might say: 
"I guess I knew she was PD all along. I just didn't know 
that I knew it." 
I submit that we have posed a genuine counter-example 
to the KK thesis. Tom knows that his wife is PD, but Tom 
does not know that he knows that she is PD. 
To deny that KK. thesis, we need only show that our 
above case is consistent with (iv) BaEap. Given our above 
case, might Tom believe that his justification for 
believing Joan is PD is complete, and still disbelieve 
that he believes that Joan is PD? 
As I argued before, Tom is completely justified in 
believing that Joan is PD. The question before us now is: 
Is our case consistent with Tom believing that he is 
completely justified in believing that Joan is PD? 
We have noted that (1) beliefs may be held for 
unconscious reasons, and (2) beliefs may themselves be 
unconsciously held. I think these two tenets enable us to 
render our case consistent with (iv). Tom believes that 
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Joan is PD. His reasons for this belief completely 
justify his belief, but his reasons are unconscious ones. 
I suggest that Tora may also believe that his reasons 
completely justify him and nonetheless hold this belief 
unconsciously. So, our case satisfies conditions (i) 
through (iv). Although Tom believes that he is completely 
justified in believing that Joan is PD, Tom is unaware of 
this belief. He has, perhaps, suppressed this belief for 
psychological reasons. And this illustrates how Tom's 
disbelief that he believes that Joan is PD is compatible 
with the satisfaction of conditions (i) through (iv). It 
is only when beliefs are identified with conscious beliefs 
that one might plausibly suppose that (iv) rules our case 
a non-knowledge case. So long as beliefs may be held 
unconsciously, as we argued they could, Tom may believe 
that he is completely justified in believing that Joan is 
PD, and concomitantly disbelieve that he believes that 
Joan is PD. I think our case (concerning Tom) captures 
just this sort of example. 
Thus, Tom may disbelieve that he believes that P, 
even though 
(i) p is true, 
(ii) Tom believes that p, 
(iii) Tom is completely justified in believing that p, and 
(iv) Tom believes that he is completely justified in 
believing that p. 
We may conclude, then, that the KK and KK, theses are 
false. This is just because both theses require (A) Bap -j 
BaBap. Since the denial of (A) (at least one instance 
thereof) is compatible with the definition of knowledge 
given in both the KK and KK. theses, our single example 
(concerning Tom) serves as a ciunter-example to both the 
KK and KK. theses. 
V 
In this essay, I have tried to show that someone may 
believe that p, while nonetheless not believe that (s)he 
believes that p. Given what I take to be an instance of 
this claim, namely the example concerning Tom, I have 
tried to show that Tom may know that his wife is 
politically dogmatic, but not know that he knows this 
(given the conceptions of knowledge assumed in the KK and 
KK theses). Our conclusion minimally shows, if it is at 
all correct, that the KK and KK. thesis are false (given 
the definition of knowledge supposed within each 
respective thesis). Although the counter-example I have 
presented admittedly depends on (1) unconscious reasons, 
and (2) unconscious beliefs, I think that these 
1<H1 
assumptions are extremely plausible. A full s?ale 
analysis of unconscious reasons and unconscious beliefs 
is, however, beyond the scope of this essay. 
University of Illinois, urbana 
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is not simply ad hoc. There is a defense for it. See 
Hilpinen, pp. 115-17. 
4 . . . . 
Let me re-emphasize that this addition is not simply 
ad hoc. I am, however, pretty suspicious about the 
validity of this added condition of knowledge. 
5 
David Rynin, "Knowledge, Sensation, and Certainty," 
in Epistemoloqy: New Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, 
ed. Avrum Stroll (Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 8-32. 
6 
I do not mean that (A) is the oly fault with the KK 
theses. Perhaps the KK theses has other problems too. 
7 I have in mind here an unconscious withholding, i.e., 
the person is unaware of his belief, and has no belief, 
one way or the other, concerning his belief. This may be 
contrasted with someone consciously withholding a belief 
on whether or not he actually believes that p. 
Of course, it is often very difficult to determine 
just what someone believes from the actions of that 
person. But if enough background information were known 
(concerning the circumstances, the sincerity of the person 
in these circumstances, etc.), certain actions would often 
enable one to determine certain beliefs held by the person 
in question. 
9 • 
Giblbert Harman, . Thought (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), p. 28. I borrow this idea from 
Harman, who argues for this position compellingly. My own 
views concerning unconscious beliefs and unconscious 
reasons are much influenced by Harman's book Thought. 
